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Abstract
Economic policy depends not only on national elections but also on coalition bargaining strategies. In coalition government,
minority parties bargain on policy and form a majority coalition, and select a Prime Minister from their mids. In Holland the
latter is done conventionally with Plurality, so that the largest party provides the chair of the cabinet. Alternative methods are
Condorcet, Borda or Borda Fixed Point. Since the role of the Prime Minister is to be above all parties and represent the
nation and to be there for all citizens, it would enhance democracy and likely be optimal if the potential Prime Minister is
selected from all parties and at the start of the bargaining process. The performance of the four selection rules is evaluated
using the results of the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary elections. The impossibility theorem by Kenneth Arrow (Nobel memorial
prize in economics 1972) finds a crucially different interpretation.
Introduction
In Holland after Parliamentary elections, it is a convention that the party with the greatest number of votes leads the efforts to
form a coalition government ("informateur"), and subsequently that this party selects the Prime Minister ("formateur"). On
June 9 2010 the Dutch had Parliamentary elections, the highest score is 31 seats in a Parliament of 150, only 21% of the
vote, and this does not seem like a strong base to select a Prime Minister. Of course, the choice on the Prime Minister is
conditional on agreements on policy. Possibly a coalition is formed in which the largest party does not partake and then the
largest party in that coalition would conventionally select the Prime Minister. However, in Colignatus (2007) "Voting Theory
for Democracy" it appears that a government "mirrorring" Parliament would tend to be optimal, which also means that the
issue on policy making could be rather distinct from the selection of the Prime Minister. Thus there is room to consider the
selection process as a separate factor apart from policy bargaining. A better separate selection process of the Prime Minister
could enhance the political base. The current method of selection is an application of the Plurality voting rule. Other ways to
select the Prime Minister are the Condorcet rule, the Borda count, and their combination the Borda Fixed Point method.
When we better understand their performance then eventually Parliament might decide to use another method than current
Plurality to select the politician to lead the efforts to form a coalition government. 
The various approaches are mentioned by Saari (2001), "Decisions and elections", except for the Borda Fixed Point method.
In his preface, Saari sighs: "I know that you messed up on some decisions. I sure have." There still is a case to be made for
suitable election methods.
This present paper thus evaluates the performance of such selection rules. The results of the Dutch elections provide a timely
testing ground. Foreign readers will hopefully not mind that we use the local letter soup. In the Borda ranking the top three
are CU (5 seats),  CDA (21) and VVD (31) and if you remember those then you should be okay. The CU and CDA are
Christian parties and VVD are liberal-conservatives (though Americans may consider this a curious combination). The party
that gets international media attention for its desire to stop immigration is PVV (24) and it may play a key role in the conven-
tional choice of the Prime Minister but it has no significant role in the better alternatives.
Plurality is the simplest scheme, and parties vote for their own candidate. As said, here VVD wins.
In pairwise voting the CU is the Condorcet winner.
However, that pairwise voting is notoriously unstable. In many elections there is no Condorcet winner, leaving one with the
question what to do next. The Borda system of preference ranking has some drawbacks too; in fact, Condorcet presented his
method since he was critical of the Borda count.
The overall best approach very likely is the Borda Fixed Point, see Colignatus (2007). This was developed with a somewhat
different line of reasoning but it can be seen as a compromise between Borda and Condorcet.
For 2010 the Borda Fixed Point method selects the CU. This happens to coincide with the Condorcet winner since the CU
apparently is rather high on the preference lists. CU has only 5 seats in a Parliament of 150 but apparently it has a strategic
position. VVD with the greatest number of votes (31) only comes in third place in the overall ranking. 
This paper does not discuss the formation of the coalition. The issue may be mentioned though since it clarifies the utility of
a more independent  selection of the Prime Minister. There  are all  kinds of possible coalitions, even when not mirroring
Parliament but having the target to minimize the majority. CU could form a coalition of CU, CDA, PvdA, D66 and GL with
a majority of 76 of 150 seats. VVD could form a coalition of VVD, CDA and PVV with a majority of 76 as well. The major
difference will be the severity of budget cuts, the investments in the environment and the approach to migration. The Chris-
tian Democrats CDA took a plunge from 41 to 21 seats but still hold a key position. If they choose for a period of opposition,
which does not seem wise, they would force a coalition of VVD, PvdA, D66 and GL, likely with VVD producing the Prime
Minister. Clearly the formation of a coalition is a tedious matter but it seems that the process could be simplified by using
information on the preferences for the selection of the Prime Minister.
The appendix investigates whether the VVD can affect this outcome by voting strategically. Other parties might try to block
that stategy.
PM 1. This calculation is based upon my own guesstimate of the rankings by parties, and the distribution of seats with 99.6%
of the votes counted, see NOS (2010). The distribution of seats can still change because of votes from foreign destinations
and re-calculation on remainder seats. The final result is on June 15.
PM 2. An analysis for 2006, see Colignatus (2006), also selected Rouvoet (CU) as Prime Minister instead of Balkenende
(CDA) who was appointed in the conventional manner. Possibly the current CDA plunge is related to this choice.
PM 3. A comparison of the United Kingdom 2010 and The Netherlands 2006 can be found in Colignatus (2010).
Data
The present outcome (99.6% of the votes counted):
Parties = {{CDA, 21}, {CU, 5}, {D66, 10}, {GL, 10}, {PvdA, 30}, {PvdD, 2}, {PVV, 24}, 
   {SGP, 2}, {SP, 15}, {VVD, 31}} // Sort
CDA 21
CU 5
D66 10
GL 10
PvdA 30
PvdD 2
PVV 24
SGP 2
SP 15
VVD 31
Items = First ê@ Parties
8CDA, CU, D66, GL, PvdA, PvdD, PVV, SGP, SP, VVD<
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NumberOfItems = Length@ItemsD
10
vlis = Last ê@ Parties;
NumberOfVoters = Length@vlisD
10
The voting weights are fractions of 1.
Votes = vlis ê Add@vlisD
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StatusQuo@D
CDA
Hypothesis
The statement of full preference orderings is a bit too complicated for the individual ballot box. However, the method can be
used in Parliament by the Members. 
The mathematical routines require party preferences on the selection of a Prime Minister. Each party can present a candidate
and then the Members  of Parliament  enter  their  orders  of preference  on the  candidates.  These  preferences  should best
expressed not by the parties but by the individual Members of Parliament.
Parties might increase their chances by proposing candidates that are well received by other parties. It is simplest to presume
that their candidates will be the leaders at the elections. 
(NB. An alternative is to allow parties to present more candidates, proportional to the size of the party. A big party might
present both its leader and some compromise candidates. However, since such compromise candidates might diminish the
value of the leader, this is a less likely approach.)
It is advisable that parties in Parliament express their preference orderings. Lacking these (I am still trying to entice them to
provide these), I give my own guesstimate. It may be noted that parties will adapt their preference orderings in the bargaining
process, when parties drop policy aims and compromise. This aspect cannot be reproduced here.
Pref@CDAD = 8CDA > CU > VVD > PvdD > GL > SP > SGP > PvdA > D66 > PVV <;
Pref@CUD = 8CU > CDA > SGP > PvdA > GL > SP > VVD > PvdD > D66 > PVV <;
Pref@D66D = 8D66 > PvdA > GL > VVD > PvdD > CU > SP > CDA > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@GLD = 8GL > SP > PvdA > PvdD > D66 > CU > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@PvdAD = 8PvdA > GL > D66 > SP > PvdD > CU > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@PvdDD = 8PvdD > D66 > GL > CU > SP > PvdA > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@PVVD = 8 PVV > VVD > CU > CDA > PvdD > SGP > SP > PvdA > D66 > GL<;
Pref@SGPD = 8 SGP > CU > CDA > PvdD > VVD > PVV > SP > PvdA > GL > D66 <;
Pref@SPD = 8SP > GL > PvdA > D66 > PvdD > CU > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@VVDD = 8VVD > CDA > CU > D66 > PvdD > PVV > GL > PvdA > SP > SGP <;
These preference patterns can be translated in Borda ordinal preference scores. A high score is a high preference.
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Preferences = PrefToList@ToPref @@ Pref@DD & ê@ Items
10 9 2 6 3 7 1 4 5 8
9 10 2 6 7 3 1 8 5 4
3 9 10 7 8 5 1 2 4 6
4 9 5 10 7 6 1 2 8 3
4 9 7 8 10 5 1 2 6 3
4 9 8 7 5 10 1 2 6 3
7 9 2 1 3 6 10 5 4 8
8 9 1 2 3 7 5 10 4 6
4 9 6 8 7 5 1 2 10 3
9 1 8 5 4 7 6 2 3 10
The Borda Fixed Point (BFP) selection
Given the above data and assumptions, the Borda Fixed Point algorithm determines the fixed point, i.e. the winner who also
wins from the runner up (the alternative winner if the overall winner would not partake).
BordaFP@D
CU
The Borda count merely sums the scores.
BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:SelectØ CU, BordaFPQØ 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 86.50667, 7.38, 5.44, 5.88667, 5.76667, 5.94667, 3.52667, 3.06667, 5.26, 6.22<,
PositionØ H 2. L, OrderingØ
3.06667 SGP
3.52667 PVV
5.26 SP
5.44 D66
5.76667 PvdA
5.88667 GL
5.94667 PvdD
6.22 VVD
6.50667 CDA
7.38 CU
>
CU (Rouvoet) would not  only have most votes in  a  Borda vote but  would also win in a  (binary) duel  from the  CDA
(Balkenende who resigned, his successor is Verhagen), where the CDA would win if the CU would not partake. CU also
wins from VVD (Rutte) that actually has the highest number of seats.
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Relation to Arrow's impossibility theorem
Arrow (1951) showed that five axioms resulted into a contradiction. He suggested that these axioms were reasonable and
morally desirable for a democracy and he concluded to an impossibility. This approach has dominated the literature since
then and some economists expressed a preference for dictatorship. Here we take a different approach. It is reasonable and
morally desirable that a process works. An impossibility thus is not reasonable and not morally desirable. Hence we have to
drop one of the axioms. For example, a tie can be broken by a flip of a coin or the chair, but Arrow's axioms require always
the same outcome and thus cannot deal with those tie breaking rules. We can make a distintion between voting and deciding.
For voting outcomes it is reasonable that there are preference cycles but when we decide on a tie then we use a tie breaking
rule. For decision making we drop the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, that is better labelled as the axiom of
pairwise decision making. We don't decide using only pairs and the limited information that they provide but we use all
information provided by the whole voting field. In this approach, the Borda Fixed Point is likely to be seen by many as the
best selection method. Alternative methods tend to have too many drawbacks. See Colignatus (2007) for a longer discussion.
Here we can evaluate the performance of the mentioned alternatives. PM. Approval voting has some popularity in academic
circles but see Colignatus (2005).
Alternative to BFP: Pairwise voting
It appears that the CU is also the Condorcet winner - i.e. wins from all pairwise votes.
This criterion however is not a strong one since there can be elections where there is no such winner or there can be elections
where that winner loses in a Borda approach.
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1Ø 8StatusQuoØ CDA, SumØ 88, 9, 3, 5, 4, 5, 0, 1, 3, 7<, MaxØ 9, Condorcet winnerØ CU,
Pref Ø Pref HPVV, SGP, 8D66, GL, PvdA, PvdD, SP<, VVD, CDA, CUL, FindØ CU,
LastCycleTestØ False, SelectØ CU<, N Ø :SumØ :
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>,
Pref Ø Pref HSGP, PVV, SP, D66, PvdA, GL, PvdD, VVD, CDA, CUL, SelectØ CU>, AllØ CU>
Alternative to BFP: the current Plurality voting
Plurality selects the person with the highest vote - that might be less than 50%. All parties vote for their own candidate. Here
VVD (Rutte) wins but has only 21% and much less than 50%.
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Plurality@D
:SumØ
CDA
7
50
CU
1
30
D66
1
15
GL
1
15
PvdA
1
5
PvdD
1
75
PVV
4
25
SGP
1
75
SP
1
10
VVD
31
150
, OrderingØ
1
75
PvdD
1
75
SGP
1
30
CU
1
15
D66
1
15
GL
1
10
SP
7
50
CDA
4
25
PVV
1
5
PvdA
31
150
VVD
, MaxØ :VVD,
31
150
>, SelectØ 8<>
% êê N
:SumØ
CDA 0.14
CU 0.0333333
D66 0.0666667
GL 0.0666667
PvdA 0.2
PvdD 0.0133333
PVV 0.16
SGP 0.0133333
SP 0.1
VVD 0.206667
, OrderingØ
0.0133333 PvdD
0.0133333 SGP
0.0333333 CU
0.0666667 D66
0.0666667 GL
0.1 SP
0.14 CDA
0.16 PVV
0.2 PvdA
0.206667 VVD
, MaxØ 8VVD, 0.206667<, SelectØ 8<>
An example pairwise vote: CU and CDA
The following example shows that the candidate of the CU would win from the candidate of the CDA in a pairwise vote.
This already follows from the phenomenon that CU is the Condorcet winner.
There  are  however 45 of such pairwise votes and thus it  is simplest if  all Members of Parliament would enter a  single
preference list (as shown above) whereafter the algorithm determines the overall result.
Being a Condorcet winner is not necessarily the best condition. The Borda Fixed Point also takes account of the rank position.
SelectPreferences@8CDA, CU<D
CheckVote::adj : NumberOfItems adjusted to 2
:Number of VotersØ 10, Number of itemsØ 2, Votes are nonnegative and add up to 1Ø True,
Preferences fit the numbers of Voters and ItemsØ True, Type of scale Ø Ordinal, Preferences give a proper orderingØ True,
Preferences add up toØ 83<, ItemsØ 8CDA, CU<, VotesØ :
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Plurality@D
:SumØ
CDA
26
75
CU
49
75
, OrderingØ
26
75
CDA
49
75
CU
, MaxØ :CU,
49
75
>, SelectØ CU>
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An example pairwise vote: CU and VVD
Since VVD has the greatest number of seats its leader is conventionally regarded as the candidate to become Prime Minister.
He however loses from Rouvoet in a pairwise vote.
SelectPreferences@8VVD, CU<D;
Plurality@D
:SumØ
CU
17
30
VVD
13
30
, OrderingØ
13
30
VVD
17
30
CU
, MaxØ :CU,
17
30
>, SelectØ CU>
Conclusion
The current Dutch convention originates in political practice and hence has a firm empirical base. It is a somewhat daring
thought to test, clarify and enhance the political base of a potential Prime Minister by using more sophisticated techniques.
The challence is shown by the difference between the conventional outcome of VVD with 31 seats and the Borda Fixed
Point outcome of CU with 5 seats, all in a Parliament with 150 seats. The conventional approach uses only limited informa-
tion (the top preference) and the sophisticated method uses whole rankings and a test on stability. The conventional approach
has the advantage that it has been used over the last century but perhaps that also shows its drawbacks.
The role of the Prime Minister is to be above the parties, to be there for all citizens, to manage the decision making process,
and to clarify government policy. Frequently there is a "premier bonus" at the polls caused by the phenomenon that many
voters appreciate  this role so that the Prime Minister in function gets more votes than would normally be the case.  The
position of Prime Minister tends to be a politically desirable goal. It provides a position to also implement specific political
goals under the umbrella or rather guise of the common cause. The original function can be enhanced when the selection is
somewhat separated from the bargaining process.
The current convention in Holland to target a coalition with minimal majority and to select the Prime Minister with Plurality
in that coalition thus finds a challenge in the optimal approach of both mirroring Parliament and selecting the Prime Minister
with the widest political base (as indicated by the Borda Fixed Point method).
 
Appendix: Strategic voting
Strategic voting can never be fully avoided.
VVD might give its competitor CU much less weight and then it indeed succeeds in toppling CU but then CDA turns up as
the winner.
Pref@VVDD = 8VVD > CDA > D66 > PvdD > PVV > GL > PvdA > SP > SGP > CU <;
Preferences = PrefToList@ToPref @@ Pref@DD & ê@ Items
10 9 2 6 3 7 1 4 5 8
9 10 2 6 7 3 1 8 5 4
3 5 10 8 9 6 1 2 4 7
4 5 6 10 8 7 1 2 9 3
4 5 8 9 10 6 1 2 7 3
4 7 9 8 5 10 1 2 6 3
7 8 2 1 3 6 10 5 4 9
8 9 1 2 3 7 5 10 4 6
4 5 7 9 8 6 1 2 10 3
9 1 8 5 4 7 6 2 3 10
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BordaFP@D
BordaFP::set : Local set found: 8CDA, VVD<
BordaFP::chg: Borda gave 8CDA<, the selected Fixed Point is CDA
CDA
BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:SelectØ CDA, BordaFPQØ 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 86.50667, 5.46, 5.82, 6.26667, 6., 6.38, 3.52667, 3.06667, 5.52667, 6.44667<,
PositionØ H 1. L, OrderingØ
3.06667 SGP
3.52667 PVV
5.46 CU
5.52667 SP
5.82 D66
6. PvdA
6.26667 GL
6.38 PvdD
6.44667 VVD
6.50667 CDA
>
However, other parties might anticipate such VVD strategic voting behaviour and they might respond by entering CU much
higher in their preferences. Then the CU indeed is restored in its top position. (If course, other parties may also see strategies
by other parties and hence adapt other scores, which creates a complex whole.)
Pref@CDAD = 8CDA > CU > VVD > PvdD > GL > SP > SGP > PvdA > D66 > PVV <;
Pref@CUD = 8CU > CDA > SGP > PvdA > GL > SP > VVD > PvdD > D66 > PVV <;
Pref@D66D = 8D66 > CU > PvdA > GL > VVD > PvdD > SP > CDA > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@GLD = 8GL > CU > SP > PvdA > PvdD > D66 > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@PvdAD = 8PvdA > CU > GL > D66 > SP > PvdD > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@PvdDD = 8PvdD > CU > D66 > GL > SP > PvdA > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@PVVD = 8 PVV > CU > VVD > CDA > PvdD > SGP > SP > PvdA > D66 > GL<;
Pref@SGPD = 8 SGP > CU > CDA > PvdD > VVD > PVV > SP > PvdA > GL > D66 <;
Pref@SPD = 8SP > CU > GL > PvdA > D66 > PvdD > CDA > VVD > SGP > PVV <;
Pref@TOND = 8 TON > CU > PVV > VVD > CDA > PvdD > SGP > SP > PvdA > D66 > GL<;
Pref@VVDD = 8VVD > CDA > D66 > PvdD > PVV > GL > PvdA > SP > SGP > CU <;
Preferences = PrefToList@ToPref @@ Pref@DD & ê@ Items
10 9 2 6 3 7 1 4 5 8
9 10 2 6 7 3 1 8 5 4
3 9 10 7 8 5 1 2 4 6
4 9 5 10 7 6 1 2 8 3
4 9 7 8 10 5 1 2 6 3
4 9 8 7 5 10 1 2 6 3
7 9 2 1 3 6 10 5 4 8
8 9 1 2 3 7 5 10 4 6
4 9 6 8 7 5 1 2 10 3
9 1 8 5 4 7 6 2 3 10
BordaFP@D
CU
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BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:SelectØ CU, BordaFPQØ 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 86.50667, 7.38, 5.44, 5.88667, 5.76667, 5.94667, 3.52667, 3.06667, 5.26, 6.22<,
PositionØ H 2. L, OrderingØ
3.06667 SGP
3.52667 PVV
5.26 SP
5.44 D66
5.76667 PvdA
5.88667 GL
5.94667 PvdD
6.22 VVD
6.50667 CDA
7.38 CU
>
A way to reduce strategic voting is to publish the votes, so that parties may have some explaining to do. A secret ballot would
hold for the individual voter in the ballot box but not necessarily for voting by Members of Parliament on the Prime Minister.
Such open statements of preference do not exclude strategic voting but they do somewhat reduce it. The element of strategy
would be reduced even more when preference  orderings are announced before the national elections so that there is less
room for tinkering after the elections.
Overall, the political discussion and the selection of the Prime Minister of the coalition cabinet would seem more sophisti-
cated when using orderings and the Borda Fixed Point method than merely taking the leader of the largest party. It would
also be advisable to have the government mirror the distribution in Parliament, since one would need a good argument to
exclude a party with say 5% of the votes from partaking in government. Party programs may also become a bit more realistic
when parties have experience in government (though this is not necessarily shown in practice).
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